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Watson v. State, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 76 (Oct. 2, 2014)1
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES TO JURY MEMBERS AND
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Summary
The Court determined that (1) a Batson objection to peremptory strikes should be
analyzed with reference to the amount of allegedly targeted-group members within the venire;
and (2) that a jury instruction is not issued in error when there was a reasonable likelihood that
the jury did not understand the instruction incorrectly, even if the rule does not comprehensively
explain the underlying doctrine, so long as it accurately states the law.
Background
In 2006, Watson disclosed to a friend that he was so upset with his wife that he could kill
her. A month later he surprised his wife with a vacation to Las Vegas where he rented a hotel
room under an alias and arrived with a firearm. After his wife’s arrival, she disappeared, and the
following day he purchased cleaning supplies and power tools. His hotel room had a strong odor,
bloodstains, and a bloodstain in the carpet that soaked through to the backing, all matching his
wife’s DNA. His vehicle and firearm also contained his wife’s blood. Later, Watson was
followed to a dumping area where he left a plastic tarp containing a decomposition odor and his
wife’s blood. He forged a note to explain her disappearance, and later wrote a letter claiming that
he dismembered and cooked parts of the body. When he was arrested he possessed fake
identification, a ticket to a town bordering the country, and traveler’s checks. After hearing this
evidence a jury found him guilty of first-degree kidnapping and first-degree murder. The jury
sentenced him to death.
Watson appealed, arguing that (1) the State’s peremptory strikes to prospective jury
members violated the Equal Protection Clause, (2) his motion to dismiss counsel and represent
himself was unconstitutional, (3) the jury instruction for mitigating circumstances could be easily
misunderstood, (4) his motion to continue after receiving record of an old mental health
diagnosis should not have been denied, (5) his request for a competency evaluation should not
have been denied, (6) and that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find aggravating
circumstances in his convictions.
Discussion
Guilt-phase issues
Juror Challenges
The Court upheld the district court’s denial of Watson’s Batson2 challenges of the States
peremptory dismissal of certain jury veniremembers. Watson argued that the State violated the
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Equal Protection Clause when it used six of its nine peremptory strikes on women, and one on an
African-American. However, the Court disagreed, finding Watson did not meet the three-part
test layed out in Batson.3 The Batson test first requires the opposing party to show a prima facie
case for discrimination. The test then uses a burden-shifting framework that requires the
proponent to show a nondiscriminatory explanation for the peremptory challenge. Lastly, the
trial court determines whether the opponent showed purposeful discrimination.
Previously, the Court found a prima facie case of discrimination when a majority of the
strikes were used on one group.4 However, in the present case the trial court did not find a prima
facie case of discrimination because Watson did not show a pattern of strikes against women. A
prima facie case must show an inference of discrimination from occurrences such as a
disproportionate effect of strikes, the nature of the proponent’s questions and statements
throughout voir dire, disparate treatment of a certain group, or whether the case at hand is
sensitive to bias. Here, Watson suggested that the use of six out of nine peremptory challenges
on women showed an inference of discrimination. Instead of using a majority, the Court
specified that it prefers to use a more detailed test, one that compares the number of strikes with
the total members in the venire with those characteristics. Thus, because this venire had more
women than men, the strikes were proportional and not likely discriminatory. The venire had 18
women and 14 men, so it would be natural for peremptory challenges to consist of more women
than men in the present case. Watson did not show a prima facie case of discrimination because
he did not offer any other evidence showing discriminatory intent. Also, Watson did not establish
a prima facie case of discrimination towards the African-American because he did not show a
pattern or offer any other evidence to support his claim.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
The Court declined to disturb the jury’s verdict. It first noted that reversal of a conviction
for insufficient evidence requires review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution. The Court next listed out in detail the following “substantial evidence” in support of
conviction: prior to the trip Watson stated that he would kill his wife, he used an alias to book a
hotel room, it was out of character for him to surprise his wife with a vacation, and he arrived to
Las Vegas armed. Further, he purchased cleaning supplies and tools while in Las Vegas, the
hotel room had a strong odor and blood stains, her blood was in his car, and he was arrested
while apparently trying to leave the country. The Court held that based on the evidence presented
at trial, a reasonable jury could find him guilty of first-degree kidnapping and first-degree
murder.
Motion for Self-Representation
The Court upheld the district court’s denial of Watson’s request to self-represent. Though
a defendant usually has a right to represent himself,5 a court has discretion to deny a request if it
2
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is “untimely, equivocal, or made for the purpose of postponing the trial.”6 The Court determined
Watson’s motion was both untimely and equivocal. It was untimely because he made it only one
month before trial while also indicating he would need a continuance. It was equivocal because
he stated he did not want to assume all responsibilities for his legal representation.7 Accordingly,
the Court determined the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Watson’s request to
represent himself.
Penalty-phase issues
Mitigation Jury Instruction
Under de novo review, the Court upheld the district court’s jury instruction on mitigating
circumstances, determining it was a correct statement of law. The Court determined that a natural
reading of the jury instruction for mitigating circumstances would take into account all
paragraphs of the instruction. The first paragraph of the instruction referred to the offense and
circumstances in which fairness and mercy would reduce the defendant’s moral culpability. The
second paragraph required the jury to consider the defendant’s character and record of other
circumstances. The Court determined that when read in its entirety, the instructions compelled
the jury to consider those factors that decrease or extenuate both the defendant’s moral
culpability and any attributes of the defendant’s character or the record.8
Watson contended that the jury would only look at “moral culpability” in relation to his
“guilt or blameworthiness,” rather than considering any mitigating circumstances relating to his
character or anything else on the record. Although the failure to object to a jury instruction at
trial usually precludes appellate review, the Eighth Amendment requires review of mitigating
evidence that may give rise to a sentence less than death. The Black’s law definition of
mitigating circumstances includes moral culpability. The definition of culpability refers to
blameworthiness or guilt. Further, when the Court used this same objection in a previous case, it
was not objected to.9
In the present case, the test is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury read
the instruction in a way that withheld constitutionally relevant information. The Court held there
was not a reasonable likelihood that a jury would misinterpret the instruction, reading the first
paragraph as excluding the consideration of the defendant’s character as a mitigating
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circumstance regardless of a relation moral culpability. The Court found that it was unlikely for a
jury to not consider these circumstances especially when they heard arguments involving the
defendant’s background, character, and other things unrelated to the offenses.
Motion to continue
The Court held that the district court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to
continue. The defendant argued that his motion to continue should not have been denied because
his records showing a previous psychiatric hospitalization were not obtained until the day that
the jury determined a verdict. The Court determined that this was not an abuse of discretion
because the defendant waited several years throughout the pending trial to disclose this
information to his attorney. Further, the information showing a mental hospitalization many
decades before the crime was used during the penalty hearing.
Competency
The Court held that the district court did not err in denying the defendant’s request for
another competency evaluation. The defendant argued that he should have been given another
competency evaluation in light of the psychiatric records. One year before trial the defendant
was found to be competent to stand trial after he responded appropriately when questioned. The
Court found that the district court did not err in denying the motion because the decision to
withhold these records, although maybe irrational, was fully the defendant’s.
Aggravating Circumstances
The Court held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the defendant
committed a murder in the course of a first-degree kidnapping. The defendant argued that the
jury had insufficient evidence to find aggravating circumstances in the kidnapping and murder.
The evidence included forethought, torture, mutilation, and blood matching his wife throughout
the crime scenes. The defendant also admitted to cooking pieces of the body and throwing them
away in an effort to conceal his wife’s body. Therefore, the Court held that this evidence is
sufficient for a jury to find that the murder involved more than the act of killing itself.10
Mandatory Review
The Court held that the death sentence was not excessive in the present case. The Court is
required to review each death sentence to determine (1) whether there is sufficient evidence for
the aggravating circumstances, (2) whether the verdict was a result of passion, prejudice, or other
arbitrary considerations, and (3) whether the death penalty is excessive in the present case.11 The
Court analyzed part one in the section above. The Court determined that the record did not show
any influence of arbitrary factors, and given the planning and dismemberment involved in the
murder the death penalty was not excessive.
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Conclusion
A gender or race-based challenge to peremptory strikes should be analyzed in reference
to the entire venire. This better shows whether there was discrimination or whether the
peremptory strikes merely reflect the characteristics of the jury pool. Next, a jury instruction for
mitigating circumstances is sufficient when there is a reasonable likelihood that a jury would
read it in its entirety. It is likely that where there are multiple paragraphs, a jury would consider
the language from the second paragraph as connecting to the paragraph above it. The Court also
held that the district court did not err in the defendant’s motions for self-representation, for a
continuance, and for a competency evaluation. It further held that there was sufficient evidence
for the verdict and for the death sentence.

